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Preface 
Your house is your larger body 
It grows in the sun and sleeps 
In the stillness of the night; 
And it is not dreamless 2
Summary: 
 In the late 1980’s, major cities began relentless campaigns to rid the 
streets and parks of the homeless.  Thousands of homeless families and 
individuals were subjected to arrest and summary destruction of their 
possessions for minor offenses such as jaywalking and dropping a leaf on 
the ground.  In 1988 the homeless brought action against the City of Miami 
alleging numerous violations of constitutional rights.  While the Pottinger 
litigation was pending, Hurricane Andrew left over 200,000 additional 
individuals homeless in Miami. 
 
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina added approximately 1.5 million members 
to America’s homeless population, bringing the total to approximately five 
million.  During the one-year since Hurricane Katrina struck, Americans 
have begun to show unmistakable signs of compassion fatigue. 
 
Las Vegas has already passed an ordinance which imposes maximum 
fines of $1,000.00 for feeding the homeless in a public park.  This Article 
explores the relevance of Pottinger in Post-Hurricane Katrina society. 
 
1 Professor of Law, Faulkner University Thomas Goode Jones School of Law, Professor Howell wishes to 
thank her son and research assistant, Christopher D. Howell, for his invaluable research and substantive 
contributions to this work.  Professor Howell also wishes to thank her friend and administrative assistant, 
Jennifer K. Johnson, for her extraordinary technical assistance and consummate professionalism. 
2 Kahlil Gibran, The Prophet, 31 (1996) 
2Introduction 
In 1998, Miami’s homeless population filed a class action, Pottinger 
v. City of Miami,3 alleging that city officials acted in concert to deprive 
them of their civil rights.  While the Pottinger litigation was ongoing, 
Hurricane Andrew struck Miami, leaving 200,000 additional homeless in its 
wake 4 in what the Pottinger court termed “a worst possible” 5 scenario. It 
was the first time that a hurricane figured in homelessness litigation, and it is 
likely that the outcome of the case was in fact affected by the hurricane.  The 
court held Miami officials liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983,6 the 
Eighth Amendment,7 the Fourth Amendment,8 the Due Process Clause,9 and 
the Right to Travel,10 perhaps in part because the tragedy of mass 
homelessness was showcased by Hurricane Andrew.  In the face of so great 
a homeless population, the Court could not dismissively assume that people 
were homeless as a result of a perverse desire to be so, nor would it ignore 
the multiple violations of their constitutional rights. 
 
The similarities between the homelessness scenarios created by 
hurricanes Andrew and Katrina are startling, each storm leaving behind an 
unassimilated, newly homeless population to join the already burgeoning 
ranks of America’s homeless population.  Compassion is already wearing 
thin, and evacuees are being ousted from temporary lodging. If adequate 
societal measures are not taken to house these evacuees, they will be forced 
to live in the streets, parks, and under bridges, as were the Pottinger 
plaintiffs.  
 
This article will explore the relevance of Pottinger as the homeless 
population rises to approximately five million in the twenty first century.  
Part I summarizes the demographics and causes of mass homelessness.  Part 
I also addresses negative public reactions to the increased visibility of the 
homeless in major American cities. 
 
3 Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (1992), [hereinafter, Pottinger]
4 Id. at 1558 
5 Id. 
6 Id. At 1560 
7 Id. At 1565 
8 Id. At 1573 
9 Id. At 1577 
10 Id. At 1582 
 
3Part II articulates the thesis of the Article.  Part III outlines and 
discusses the successful causes of action brought by the homeless in 
Pottinger v. Miami.  And Part IV, the conclusion, sets forth proposals that 
would reinvigorate incentives to construct additional affordable housing, 
revisit America’s regressive tax schedule, and afford the homeless suspect 
classification. 
 
I. 
Overview of Homelessness Before Hurricane Katrina 
a. 
Demographics 
 In 2000, an estimated two million Americans were homeless on any 
given night.11 Between 2.5 and 3.5 million Americans experienced 
homelessness every year,12 and thirty percent of the homeless had been 
without homes for more than two years.13 These numbers do not include the 
indeterminate number of individuals who had no homes and were “doubled 
up”14 living with friends or relatives.  Only those persons “who lack a 
permanent address and sleep in places not designed to be sleeping 
accommodations for human beings…and those living in shelters”15 were 
considered homeless; thus, those living under the roofs of their families and 
friends did not meet the definition. 
 
Adult males constituted 44% of the homeless population before 
Hurricane Katrina.16 Women17 accompanied by minor children18 were the 
 
11 http://www.policyalmanac.org/social_welfare.html 2/21/05 (last visited Sept. 7, 2005) [hereinafter, 
Policyalmanac 
12 Jonathan L. Hafety, Homeless Legal Advocacy: New Challenges and Directions for the Future, 30 
Fordham Urb. L. J. 1215, 1219 (2003) 
13 Policyalmanac, supra note10 
14 Beth C. Weitzman, James R. Knickman & Marybeth Shinn, Pathways to Homelessness Among New York 
Families, 46 J. Soc. Issues 127, 133 (1990) 
15 42 U.S.C. 11301 (1995) (The Stewart B. McKinney Act) 
16 Policyalmanac, supra note 10 
17 Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 J.L. Pol’y 237 (1994) “Fifty percent of 
the homeless women in America were fleeing domestic violence.” See, Leonara M. Lapedus, Doubly 
Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 11 Am. U. J. Gender Soc., 
Pol’y L. 377 (2003) A battered woman residing in publicly subsidized housing was evicted because she 
reported having been battered by her husband.  See, also, Eliza Hurst, Note: The Housing Crisis for Victims 
of Domestic Violence, 10 Geo. J. Poverty Law & Pol’y 131 (2003) “Because women are disproportionately 
the victims of domestic violence, public housing authorities that evict families for criminal activity may 
punish women, as a class, for the acts of their abusers.”     
18 Deborah M. Thompson, Breaking the Cycle of Poverty:  Models of Legal Advocacy to Implement the 
Educational Promise of the McKinney Act for Homeless Children and Youth, 31 Creighton L. Rev. 1209 
(1998) “For Children, homelessness not only threatens their stability and security, it poses a tremendous 
barrier to the one thing that may give them hope for a better life – a better education.” 
4fastest growing segment of the chronically homeless19 and made up 36% of 
the homeless population.20 Some 750,000 children were homeless21 before 
Katrina and 1.5 million elderly had “worst case housing needs.”22 Fifty 
percent of the homeless were African-American, 35% White, 12% Hispanic, 
2% Native American, and 1% were Asian Americans.23 
b. 
The Causes 
 The causes of America’s rising homelessness rate have been debated 
for decades. Some contend that personal deficiencies such as mental 
illness,24 substance abuse,25 incarceration,26 and an intergenerational 
dependence upon welfare27 are the primary causes of homelessness.  Others 
cite macro economic factors such as loss of low-income housing,28 
unemployment and underemployment,29 and a regressive tax structure.30 
Neither theory considered natural disasters. 
 
c. 
 
19 Policyalmanac, supra note 10 
20 Id. 
21 Thompson at 1209 
22 http://www.huduser.org/publications/affhsg/worstcase/finding6.html. (Last visited March 15, 2005) 
23 Policyalmanac, supra note 10 
24 See, e.g., Marybeth Shinn, Homelessness: What is A Psychologist to Do?, 20 Am. J. Community 
Psycho.3 (1992) In one sample of homeless individuals treated at a psychiatric facility, some 97% had been 
previously treated for psychiatric problems.  But see, Martha L. Burt & Barbara E. Cohen, Differences 
Among Homeless Single Women, Women with Children, and Single Men, 36 Soc. Probs. 508, 516 (1989), 
finding that mental illness is more often the result of homelessness that the actual cause. 
25 See, e.g., Crystal Mills & Hira Ota, Homeless Women with Minor Children in the Detroit Metropolitan 
Area, 34 Soc. Work 485, 487 (1989) A study of eighty-seven sheltered homeless in Detroit revealed only a 
9.2% history of substance abuse.  But see, Alice S. Baum & Donald W. Burnes, A Nation in Denial:  The 
Truth About Homelessness, 49 – 52, (1993) 
26 Prior incarceration does seem to predispose newly released former inmates to homelessness insofar as 
federal regulations disqualify them for publicly subsidized housing for a lengthy period. 24 C.F.R. 960.203 
(c) (2001). 
27 Some researchers have found support for the theory that intergenerational dependence upon welfare 
promotes ultimate homelessness.  See, Ellen L. Bassuk & Lynn Rosenberg, Why Does Family 
Homelessness Occur?  A Case Control Study, 78 Am. J. Pub. Health 783, 787. (1988) Other studies show 
that many of the homeless have significant work histories and no dependence on welfare. 
28 A study in New York City indicated that almost 50% of homeless families had never been able to afford 
a place of their own.  Weitzman, Knickman, & Shinn, supra, note 13 at 135. 
29 Lelia M. Reyes & Laura DeKoven Waxman, U.S. Conference of Mayors, The Continuing Growth of 
Hunger, Homelessness, and Poverty in America’s Cities at 47 (1987) Plant closings and loss of blue collar 
work for Americans produces significant unemployment. 
30 Changes in tax laws beginning in the late seventies have increased tax burdens upon the poor and middle 
class while creating tax loopholes for the rich.  See, Lawrence Miskel & David M. Frankel, The State of 
Working America at 55 (1991) 
 
5Public Reaction 
Years before Hurricane Katrina created the largest homeless 
population in American history, the public had developed compassion 
fatigue31 with homelessness.  San Francisco enacted a series of ordinances 
through its so-called Matrix Program that criminalized sleeping in a park, 
begging near a highway, and blocking a sidewalk.32 Eleven thousand of San 
Francisco’s poorest people were incarcerated as a result of the Matrix 
Program33 alone. In Santa Anna, the homeless were rounded up, transported 
to a football stadium, physically marked with numbers, chained for hours, 
and ultimately released to a different location.34 
Massachusetts imposed criminal sanctions upon those who “move 
about from place to place begging.”35 Alabama made it a criminal act to 
wander about “in a public place for the purpose of begging.”36 
In Florida, which was the venue for Pottinger, homelessness had 
increased dramatically in Miami since 1984.37 Thousands of homeless 
individuals were sleeping in Bicentennial Park38 and other public venues 
where they kept their meager belongings, which typically included blankets, 
clothing, food, identification, eyeglasses, and sometimes medications.39 City 
police were directed “to identify food sources for the poor and to arrest 
and/or force an extraction of the undesirables from the area.”40 The police 
were to keep the homeless moving in order “to sanitize”41 the parks and 
streets.  Raids upon the campsites of the homeless were relentless, and their 
belongings were often summarily destroyed at the site.42 
31 See, Nancy A. Millich, “Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment:  Are the Homeless 
Constitutional Castaways?” 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 255 (1994) 
32 Nancy Wright, “Not in Anyone’s Backyard:  End the ‘Contest of Non-Responsibility’ and Implementing 
Long-Term Solutions to Homelessness,” 2 Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 163, 199 (1995) 
33 Id. 
34 Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 32 Cal. App. 4th 941, 948 (1994) 
35 Mass. Gen. L.ch. 272§63 (1992) 
36 Ala. Code §13-A-11-9 (a) (1) (West 1994) 
37 Pottinger, supra note 2 at 1158 
38 Id. at 1560 
39 Id. at 1571 
40 Id. at 1567 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1560 
6History is repeating itself.  On July 28, 2006, the New York Times in 
an article entitled “Please Don’t Feed the Homeless in Parks”43 reported that 
Las Vegas had enacted an ordinance banning giving food to the homeless.  
A violation of the ordinance can be punished by a maximum fine of 
$1,000.00 and a jail term of up to six months.  
 
II. 
Thesis 
 If America’s Post-Katrina response to its unprecedented surge of 
homelessness is to harass the homeless by jailing them or jailing those who 
feed the homeless, the issues and remedies addressed in Pottinger become 
relevant anew. 
 
III. 
Pottinger Revisited 
a. 
The Eighth Amendment 
 The most sensitive issue in homelessness litigation concerns the 
voluntariness of the homeless defendant’s actions. Purely involuntary acts 
cannot properly or morally be condemned as crimes under the Eighth 
Amendment. To punish a person for his involuntary act would be cruel. The 
question then is whether a homeless person’s acts are voluntary. A homeless 
person who commits rape cannot reasonably assert his homelessness as 
justification for his misdeeds. In that case his status as a homeless person is 
irrelevant, and society cannot reasonably be expected to tolerate such 
behavior.  The question is more complex when a homeless defendant with 
nowhere else to go is prosecuted for harmless acts such as sleeping in a park. 
Is a public action  “voluntary” when the homeless defendant must perform it 
to survive, and he has no private place in which to perform the action?  The 
Pottinger court resolved the question by asking another question: Is the 
defendant voluntarily homeless?44 If a defendant has voluntarily chosen to 
be homeless, he could be legally and morally deemed to have voluntarily 
assumed the risk of having to break the law to survive.  It is unreasonable for 
society to lower its expectation of public conduct in order to accommodate a 
private and voluntary choice of that character. On the other hand, the 
defendant’s homelessness is involuntary, a just society should not prosecute 
 
43 Randal C. Archibold, “Please Don’t Fee Homeless in Parks, Las Vegas Says in Ordinance,” N.Y. 
Times, July 28, 2006 
44 Pottinger, supra note 2 at 1558 
 
7him for the indicia that attach to the fact of his homelessness.    The success 
of the Pottinger case rested in large part upon the plaintiffs’ ability to prove 
that they were suffering an involuntary45 state of homelessness and were 
compelled to perform life-sustaining acts in public view.46 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Robinson v. California47 held that a 
defendant could not be criminally punished for his mere status as a drug 
addict, finding that a statute that made it punishable to be addicted to 
narcotics constituted cruel and unusual punishment.48 In Powell v. Texas49 
the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue of whether an alcoholic could 
be jailed for appearing drunk in public.50 The Supreme Court held that 
Powell had not been jailed for merely being addicted to alcohol, but for his 
active conduct of appearing in public in a drunken state.51 Powell is often 
cited by municipalities that arrest the homeless.  The argument is that the 
homeless are not being punished for being homeless, but for their actions in 
violation of the law. Such arguments miss the point when the defendant is 
involuntarily homeless. The alcoholic, theoretically, can restrict his drinking 
to his home and avoid punishment, but the homeless have no homes in 
which to perform what are usually private acts.52 Sleeping in parks, sitting 
on sidewalks, and begging are perfect examples.  To criminalize such 
actions when they are unavoidable is tantamount to prosecuting the 
homeless for existing, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishments is impermissibly infringed.   
 
The burden has historically been upon the plaintiffs to establish that 
their public actions were in fact unavoidable. In Pottinger the plaintiffs met 
that burden with statistical evidence and expert testimony.53 The plaintiffs 
offered irrefutable statistical evidence of the severe shortage of beds in 
homeless shelters54 in Miami when they were arrested.  The expert witnesses 
also testified that people seldom choose to be homeless.55 However, a public 
 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1574 
47 370 U.S. 660 (1962) 
48 Id. at 666 
49 392 U.S. 514 (1968) 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 532 
52 Powell, 392 U.S. at 511, Justice White in his concurrence voiced concern about whether a homeless 
alcoholic could be punished for public drunkenness without violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
53 Pottinger, supra note 2 at 1565 
54 Id. at 1558 
55 Id. at 1557 
8policy that requires the homeless to bear the burden of proving the 
voluntariness of their status is inherently flawed.  The homeless, by 
definition, are persons with extremely limited resources, and they are not 
entitled to state appointed attorneys in civil litigation in defense of their 
rights. But for the pro bono advocacy of the American Civil Liberties 
Union,56 the Pottinger plaintiffs would have lacked the resources to amass 
statistics proving Miami’s shelters were inadequate to house the homeless 
population.  Nor would the homeless have been able to procure the experts57 
who were pivotal in establishing that people are seldom homeless by 
choice.58 The better public policy would allow the plaintiff to meet the 
burden of a prima facie case by establishing the actions committed by the 
state or municipality in violation of his rights and the fact of his 
homelessness at the time of his arrest.  The burden should then shift to the 
defendants to establish to a preponderance that the plaintiff is voluntarily 
homeless and thus answerable for his public actions. This policy would 
serve dual meritorious purposes: The homeless plaintiff would be enhanced 
in his ability to find counsel who would accept his case, and the states and 
their municipalities would have greater motivation to cease their efforts to 
harass the homeless out of their towns and instead explore serious options 
for providing adequate affordable housing.    
 
b. 
The Fourth Amendment 
The homeless are gravely concerned about the conservation of those 
meager resources that they still have. In Miami the police frequently 
destroyed the belongings of the homeless onsite,59 treating the property as 
public rubbish. On one particularly notorious raid, the Miami police 
handcuffed a group of homeless individuals, piled their clothing, 
medications, and a Bible together, and burned them while the homeless 
watched.60 The homeless contended that the police seized and destroyed 
their property without due process of law in direct violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.61 
56 Benjamin Waxman, “Homeless in Miami,” http://www.acluFL.org. (1998) 
57 Pottinger, supra note 2 at 1557 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1560 
60 Id. at 1573 
61 Id. 
9While a seizure of property occurs when there is a “meaningful 
interference” with an individual’s interest in that property,62 a seizure of 
property is unreasonable only if the state’s legitimate interests in the seizure 
do not outweigh the individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
object of the search.63 The inquiry then is whether the plaintiffs have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in personal property that may appear to 
others to be public rubbish. Determining the nature of any legitimate 
expectation of privacy in personal property involves two separate inquiries: 
first, whether the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
objects;64 and, second, whether that expectation is one that society should be 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.65 If the homeless make efforts to protect 
their belongings by attempting to shelter them from public view, stacking 
them in organized piles, or designating another homeless person to guard 
them, there is evidence of subjective expectation of privacy. The second 
inquiry is more difficult. Should the public recognize the homeless person’s 
right to privacy when her property is littering the streets or public parks?  In 
Rakas v. Illinois66 the United States Supreme Court offered guidelines for 
determining the legitimacy of a plaintiff’s privacy interests.  If the plaintiff is 
a trespasser or he leaves his property accessible to the public, he may lose 
his privacy interests in his property; whereas, one who is lawfully upon 
property and shields his property from public view may retain a subjective 
expectation in privacy that the public will recognize.  The term trespasser is 
turned on its head, and loses its definition “when there is nowhere”67 private 
that a homeless person can lawfully be and so he remains upon public 
property.  
 
The Supreme Court has not specifically spoken to the issue of whether 
a homeless person living outdoors has a privacy interest in their property 
that the public would find reasonable, but a Connecticut court has addressed 
the issue in part. In State v. Mooney,68 the court recognized a right of 
privacy in the closed duffel bags of the homeless deriving from society’s 
previous deferential treatment in closed containers, stating: 
 
62 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 103, 126 (1984) 
63 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) 
64 Wells v. State, 402 So. 2d 402, 404 (Fla. 1981) (Citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735) (1979) 
65 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-144 (1979) 
66 Id. (Persons asserting neither a property nor a possessory interest in a vehicle have no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in property in the glove compartment) 
67 Pottinger, supra note 2 at 1577 
68 588 A.2d 145 (1991) 
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[the interior of [these items is, in effect, the defendant’s last shred of 
privacy from the prying eyes of outsiders, including the police. Our 
notions of custom and civility, and our code of values, would include 
some measure of respect for that shred of privacy, and would 
recognize it as reasonable under the circumstances of this case.69 
Does a homeless person have a lesser interest in his clothing or 
medications because he has no duffel bag in which to enclose them? From 
the perspective of the homeless, the answer is self- evident. 
Correspondingly, however, the municipalities also have a legitimate interest 
in the sanitation and safety of public spaces,70 which can be compromised by 
the accumulation of rubbish.  The Pottinger court balanced the conflicting 
interests, holding that the homeless had a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in their property so long as the property did not create a public danger.71 The 
court held that the city was free to confiscate items such as mattresses with 
exposed springs because such items posed a clear danger. However, the 
practice of destroying the non-harmful possessions such as Bibles, clothing, 
eyeglasses, medications, and personal identification was enjoined and 
declared in violation of the Fourth Amendment.72 
c. 
Procedural Due Process 
Ordinances that prohibit the homeless from performing innocent, 
necessary functions in public often fail for vagueness or overbreadth. A 
statute is vague when it fails to give fair notice of the forbidden conduct.73 
Vagrancy ordinances were held void in Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville74 by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972 because the statutes did 
not give sufficiently clear notice of the behavior that was prohibited.75 
Loitering statutes have suffered the same fate. In 1983, the U.S. Supreme 
Court overturned California’s loitering statute that required citizens 
wandering the streets to produce identification upon the request of a police 
officer.76 
69 Id. at 161 (The court analogized the property inside a homeless person’s duffel bag to property behind 
the locked door of a home) 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 261 (1983) 
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Oddly, the homeless plaintiffs did not attack Miami’s ordinances on a 
vagueness theory. Instead the plaintiffs focused upon the unconstitutional 
overbreadth of the ordinances when they were applied to innocent conduct 
of the homeless. 
 
A statute is overbroad when it reaches constitutionally protected 
conduct or conduct which is beyond the power of the state to regulate.77 A 
challenge based upon overbreadth will be upheld if the enactment reaches “a 
substantial amount”78 of constitutionally protected conduct. Prior to 
Pottinger there was no precedent for acts such as eating, sleeping, and sitting 
to enjoy constitutional protection, unless such acts could be characterized as 
expressive conduct.79 For the most part, however, when the homeless eat, 
sleep, and sit in public, they intend no expressive conduct. They are 
performing those acts for the same reasons the housed perform them: they 
are necessary to survival. However, the Pottinger court held that when an 
involuntarily homeless person performs such acts in public “at a time of day 
when there is no place they can lawfully be,”80 the statute becomes 
overbroad when it punishes innocent conduct, and the Fourth Amendment 
due process clause is impermissibly infringed.81 
d. 
The Right to Travel 
 The United States has recognized the right to travel as a fundamental 
right in 1941 in Edwards v. California.82 The U.S. Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the Edwards decision in Shapiro v. Thompson,83 striking down a 
Connecticut statute denying public assistance to persons who had not been 
residents of the state for one year, opining that the statute discouraged travel 
by the poor by withholding benefits from those who would otherwise 
qualified to receive them.84 In 1972, the Supreme Court in Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County85 struck down a statute that conditioned free 
 
77 Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 614 F 2d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1980), striking down Dade County’s loitering statute as 
overbroad because it punished innocent associations in violation of first amendment associational rights. 
78 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982) 
79 People v. Davenport, 176 Col. App. 3rd Supp. 10 (Cal. Super. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986) 
80 Pottinger, supra note 2 at 1577 
81 Id. 
82 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 171 (1941)  The U.S. Supreme Court struck down California’s 
statute making it a misdemeanor to transport an indigent person into California. 
83 394 U.S. 618 (1969) 
84 Id at 634 
85 415 U.S. 250 (1974) 
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medical care upon a one-year residency requirement.86 This case is 
especially significant in homelessness cases because the Supreme Court 
specifically denounced the statute for denying indigents “the basic 
necessities of life”87 and for the deterrent affect such statutes have on the 
rights of the poor to migrate.   
 
Because the right to travel is a fundamental right, statutes or 
ordinances infringing that right must be in furtherance of a compelling state 
interest88 and they must represent the least intrusive method for furthering 
those state interests.89 State interests such as maintaining public spaces in 
order to promote tourism, business, and developing inner city downtown and 
park areas are not compelling interests. The United States Supreme Court 
has held that such interests are substantial,90 but not compelling. Further, the 
practice of arresting the homeless is not narrowly tailored to achieving the 
goals of promoting tourism or developing business. The involuntarily 
homeless arrested under such laws have no recourse but to return to their 
public lives upon their release from custody, and nothing is ultimately 
accomplished by the arrests. If cities wish to promote their attractiveness to 
business and tourism, they must address both short-term and permanent 
housing for their homeless populations. 
e. 
42 U.S.C. 1983 
Every person who, under color of any statute or ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the constitution or laws, shall be 
liable to the injured person in an action in law suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress….” 
 
86 Id. at 250 
87 Id. (Memorial Hospital argued that treating the homeless and other indigents over-burdened the tax base 
of Arizona’s taxpayers.  The court held that “a state may not protect the public finances by drawing an 
invidious distinction between classes of its citizens,” effectively discriminating by wealth and property.  
See, Jane B. Barron, “The ‘No Property’ Problem:  Understanding Poverty by Understanding Wealth,” 102 
Mich. L. Rev. 1000, (2004) 
88 Personnel Administrators v. Feeney, 942 U.S. 256, 266 (1979) 
89 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. 473 U. S. 432, 439-440 (1985) 
90 Clark V. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984) 
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In 1961 the United States Supreme Court reinvigorated civil rights 
protections that had largely remained dormant for some ninety years. In 
Monroe v. Pape91 the Supreme Court concluded that a party injured by the 
unconstitutional actions of police offices could recover damages in federal 
court under 1983. The police broke into the Monroe home, rousted them 
from bed, and ransacked the house.92 Mr. Monroe was arrested, but was not 
allowed to call his attorney.93 He was not promptly arraigned. Monroe 
claimed that he suffered an unlawful search and seizure in Violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.94 He further claimed that his constitutional rights had 
been violated by the detention. The Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court’s dismissal of the claims against the police officers,95 opining inter alia 
that actions of the police may be actionable when they are in violation of 
rights secured by the constitution. 
 
Municipalities may also be held liable for the actions of city officials 
when those officials act to execute a “policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent 
official policy.”96 In 1983 litigation the homeless plaintiffs also bear the 
burden of establishing that the actions were both persistent and 
widespread.97 Evidence that the actions were isolated would be legally 
insufficient to warrant relief against the municipality,98 though the offending 
officers might remain liable for the actions. 
 
Discovery in Pottinger revealed internal memoranda that were 
“directed to high-ranking police department officials”99 regarding the need 
to oust the homeless from Miami’s public areas. The persistent and 
widespread nature of the attacks on the homeless was a matter of public 
record. Over thirty-five hundred homeless individuals had been arrested in 
Miami when suit was filed. The city could not escape liability under 1983 
for its acts of purposeful harassment of the homeless.100 
91 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 170 
95 Id at 192 
96 Monell v. City of New York Dept. of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658,  , (1978) 
97 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) 
98 Id. 
99 Pottinger, supra note 2 at 1561 
 
100 Id. 
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f. 
Equal Protection: 
In Harper v. State Board of Elections101 the United States Supreme 
Court opined that “wealth, like race, creed, or color is not germane to ones 
ability to participate in the electoral process.  Lines drawn on the basis of 
wealth or property, like those of race are traditionally disfavored.”102 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has declined every opportunity to grant the 
homeless the suspect classification that is afforded to other historically 
victimized groups.  This status is critical to the homeless population since 
only those state laws that discriminate against suspect groups are subjected 
to strict scrutiny,103 and cannot stand unless the state demonstrates a 
compelling interest that is furthered by a narrowly tailored policy.104 
The Supreme Court has adopted the following criteria in its suspect 
class analysis: (1) whether the disadvantaged class is defined by a trait that 
frequently bears no relationship to ability to contribute to society, (2) 
whether the class has been saddled with unique disabilities because of 
prejudice and inaccurate stereotypes; and (3) whether the trait defining the 
class is immutable.105 The homeless can make a strong claim to being a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class. 
 
The homeless are a class defined by their abject poverty, and that state 
of poverty frequently bears no relationship to an actual inability to contribute 
to society. Many of the homeless have strong work histories106 and were 
rendered homeless by events beyond their control,107 and one has only to 
review the acts perpetrated against the homeless in Miami, San Francisco, 
and San Diego to be persuaded of the dangerous prejudice of the public 
against the homeless. The last prong of the test is more difficult. Do the 
homeless have defining, immutable characteristics?  If the term means 
literally “a characteristic that cannot be changed,” the homeless must fail in 
their attempts to achieve suspect classification. The judicial history of the 
term does not, however, suggest so rigid a definition. Aliens, who enjoy 
 
101 383 U.S. 663 (1966) 
102 Id. Harper at 668 
103 Feeney, supra note 87 at 266 
104 Cleburne, supra Note 88 at 440 
105 Lyng v. Castillo, 447 U.S. 635 at 638 (1986 ) 
106 Christina Victoria Tusan, note “Homeless Families from 1980 – 1996:  Casualties of Declining Support 
for the War on Poverty,” 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1141, 1169 (1997) 
107 beyond control 
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protection as a suspect class, can become citizens, thereby changing their 
“immutable” characteristic. Gender, which is protected, can be altered 
surgically, thus altering the gender characteristic. The mere fact that the 
homeless can again become housed does not alter the fact that while one is 
in fact homeless, it is physically apparent to society.  
 
The Supreme Court in Lyng108 adopted a broader interpretation of 
immutability, including an enquiry as to whether the class members “exhibit 
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a 
discrete group.”109 The homeless have glaringly distinguishing 
characteristics: They reside under bridges, sleep in parks, shelters and other 
public places, and they beg. Their identity is unmistakable: the best evidence 
the police had no trouble whatever identifying them in Miami, in San 
Francisco, and in San Diego. 
 
The Aftermath 
 Litigation in Pottinger spanned a decade. Ultimately, the court 
enjoined the city of Miami from arresting its homeless so long as they ere 
not engaged in conduct harmful to others or themselves.110 Miami was 
ordered to establish “safe zones”111 in areas where the homeless could access 
food programs and health services. The parties ultimately negotiated a 
financial settlement for the homeless plaintiffs.112 
The impact of the case was immediate. Both the city of Miami and 
other private entities constructed shelters for the homeless while the case 
was on appeal.113 As word spread about the decision in Miami, other cities 
took stock of their own practices. Fort Lauderdale, Florida stopped its “bum 
sweeps”114 and began encouraging its officers to refer the homeless to social 
services in lieu of making arrests.115 
108 Lyng,  supra note 105 at 638 
109 Id. 
110 Pottinger, supra note 2 at 1584 
111 Id. 
112 Waxman, supra, note 55 
113 Id. 
114 “Ft. Lauderdale Learns a Lesson from Miami in Dealing with the Homeless,” Reprinted from Law 
Enforcement News, May 2000 
115 Id. 
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IV 
Conclusion 
As America’s homeless population reaches five million after 
Hurricane Katrina, Pottinger-type abuses such as those in Las Vegas are to 
be anticipated unless society becomes pro-active. Congress must reinforce 
incentives for constructing low-income housing and raise the minimum 
wage. Meanwhile, “safe areas” must be available to those who have nowhere 
else to go, and human resources must be provided to patrol those areas to 
protect homeless men, women, and children from the violence of the streets.  
 
The homeless must be afforded a “suspect class” designation. The 
homeless are America’s most vulnerable population. They are easily 
identified and despised for characteristics they cannot readily change. They 
have suffered the deprivation of the most fundamental rights because their 
very existence frightens the greater population on a visceral level. The goal, 
however, is not only to place the homeless in a better position to defend their 
constitutional rights, but to create a society that does not complain of 
“compassion fatigue,” but instead is indefatigably compassionate and 
committed116 to the welfare of even its poorest citizen. 
116 America’s largest religions all urge their followers to a commitment to the less fortunate. 
“A Muslim asserts his/her belief in the merciful and compassionate God by donating money or 
goods to those less fortunate.  This idea is connected to the belief in Islam that all wealth 
ultimately belongs to God.  We have it on loan to be used in God’s path to do good deeds in this 
life.”  Dr. James Pavlin, “An Islamic View on Caring For Those in Need,” IRF Newsletter #51-
Spring 2003. 
 
“The Jewish community has historically seen itself responsible to feed and house the hungry and 
the homeless.  In fact in Hebrew times there is no word for charity.  Rather, the caring for those in 
need is called Tzedaka, a derivative of the Hebrew term for righteousness.”  Rabbi N. I. Barowitz, 
“A Jewish View on Hunger and Homelessness,” IRF Newsletter. 
 
“When we give to others without any desire or expectation, when we let go of our attachments, we 
find ourselves relieved of the complications that worldly possessions often bring with them.  This 
means while charity can be done for religious purposes, it should be done because the individual 
enjoys helping others and the benefits are self-satisfying.” 
Netta Mehta, “A Hindu View on Hunger and Homelessness,” IRF Newsletter #48-May/June 2002 
 
“The Gospel call to be close to Christ who is “homeless” is an invitation to all the baptized to examine their 
own lives, and to trust their brothers and sisters with practical solidarity by sharing their hardships.  By 
openness and generosity, as a community and as individuals, Christians can serve Christ present in the poor 
and bear witness to the Father’s love.”  1997 Lenten Message from Pope John Paul II 
